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Introduction

“

It is the
seemingly
“self-evident”
nature of
content
knowledge
that obscures
a range of
epistemic
questions.

”

In his introduction to literary theory for tertiary
students, Jonathan Culler (2011) writes that the
endless nature of theory can be overwhelming. A
field of research may appear exhilarating in its infinite
possibilities, but the very impossibility of mastery may
also prove immobilising for a beginning researcher.
However, as Culler notes, this is “the condition of life
itself” (p. 16), and the rewards of a researcher are not
necessarily located at a specific destination, but in
moving forward, testing knowledge and assumptions,
asking new questions and seeing the world in
different ways (p. 16-7). These comments are apposite
in any number of fields, but they are particularly
relevant to teachers, whose presence in the classroom
implicitly indicates that they have achieved a level of
mastery in their area(s) of study. Culler’s reflections
raise some interesting questions for teachers in all
sectors—from early childhood specialists and primary
teachers who are trained in a range of subjects
and skills to high school teachers who specialise in
discipline areas. It is the very nature of knowledge
and theory—articulated by Culler—that provides the
guiding question for this paper: What does it mean for
a teacher to “know well”?
Despite the overwhelming support for a shift for
teachers from “sage on the stage” to “guide on the
side”, it seems self-evident that teachers still need
mastery over their subject. Ball, Thames and Phelps
(2008) illustrate this point, explaining that the need
to research content delivery was clear “[b]ecause
it seemed obvious that teachers need to know the
topics and procedures that they teach” (p. 395). This
paper proposes that it is the seemingly “self-evident”
nature of content knowledge that obscures a range of
epistemic questions that could illuminate pedagogical
issues and improve teaching praxis at all stages of
career development.
The New South Wales Quality Teaching Model
(QTM) (NSW DET, 2003) identifies three dimensions of
quality teaching: Intellectual quality, Quality learning

environment and Significance. The QTM breaks
down the field of Intellectual quality into six areas:
deep knowledge; deep understanding; problematic
knowledge; higher-order thinking; metalanguage;
and substantive communication (p. 9). Faull’s (2009)
paper on highly effective teachers draws on existing
research to list six correlating characteristics in the
domain of Intellectual Quality: 1) displaying a rich
factual knowledge about teaching; 2) possessing an
in-depth knowledge of subject matter; 3) having a
rich procedural knowledge about teaching strategies;
4) currency of knowledge; 5) the willingness to be
a learner; and 6) the encouragement of higher level
reflection on metacognitive processes and products
(p. 36). The purpose of this investigation is to build
on Faull’s research by unpacking three of these areas:
an in-depth knowledge of subject matter; currency
of knowledge; and the willingness to be a learner.
The term “epistemic responsibility”—specifically,
the imperative on a teacher to “know well”—will be
explored within this framework.

Theoretical Framework
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned
with the sources, nature and scope of knowledge.
More broadly, it can be usefully employed to
explore “issues having to do with the creation
and dissemination of knowledge in particular
areas of inquiry” (Steup, 2013). Lorraine Code
has made a significant contribution to this field
of inquiry, most recently in her book Ecological
Thinking (2006) which explores the political
implications of an individual’s claim to “know”.
Her earlier work, Epistemic Responsibility (1987),
however, provides some guiding principals that
can inform some of the issues raised in this paper.
The book draws heavily on virtue ethics to tease
out the implications of what it means to claim to
“know well”. Code argues that “knowing well”
is a responsibility for any individual making a
knowledge claim, and aims “to examine conditions
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for knowing well, not to provide a formula for
acquiring indubitable knowledge” (p. 221).
Following Code, this paper does not propose that
formulas are necessary—or even possible—for
establishing epistemic competence. Indeed, as
Biggs and Tang (2011) write, “wise and effective
teaching is not … simply a matter of applying
general principles of teaching according to rule;
they need adapting to each teacher’s own personal
strengths and teaching context” (p. 45). A key
competency for individuals who would “know
well” is, according to Code (1987), the capacity
for reflexive epistemic questioning. She writes that
only by having self-knowledge can one improve
on it: “To strive for insight into the extent of one’s
own cognitive capacities, to distance oneself as
much as possible so one can be critical of one’s
own knowing, is a crucially important aspect of
epistemic competence” (p. 176). To this end, this
paper will sketch some scenarios in which key
epistemic questions can help a teacher define their
position in relation to their content knowledge,
and explore a practitioner’s responsibility to “know
well” according to stages of career development.
An additional theoretical framework defines
the scope of this inquiry. This framework builds
on Shulman’s (1986) influential article “Those
who understand: Knowledge growth in teaching”.
In this paper, Shulman asks some important
epistemic questions: “What are the sources of
teacher knowledge? What does a teacher know
and when did he or she come to know it? How is
new knowledge acquired, old knowledge retrieved,
and both combined to form a new knowledge
base?” (p. 8). Shulman’s focus is located at the
intersection of content knowledge translation
into teaching practice. This area was termed
pedagogical content knowledge, which, as the
name implies, emphasises the interdependence of
content knowledge and pedagogical praxis. Ball,
Thames and Phelps (2008) helpfully build on the
foundation set by Shulman. They identify subdomains that differentiate between types of content
and pedagogical knowledge for the purpose of
analysis. Of these four domains: common content
knowledge; specialised content knowledge;
knowledge of content and students; and knowledge
of content and teaching, this paper focuses
on the first two: common content knowledge
and specialised content knowledge. Ball et al.
(2008) define common content knowledge as
“the knowledge and skill used in settings other
than teaching”, and are careful to acknowledge
that “common” does not mean “everyone has
this knowledge”. Rather, it indicates “that this

knowledge is of a kind used in a wide variety of
settings—in other words, not unique to teaching”
(p. 399). Specialised content knowledge refers to
the knowledge and skill unique to teaching that
belongs to a specific discipline.
A connection can be drawn between these
four domains and the National Professional
Standards for Teachers (NPST). The introduction
to the NPST outlines seven standards grouped into
three domains. Of these, common and specialised
content knowledge can be mapped to the domain
of “Professional Knowledge” and the first part of
standard 2: “Know the content and how to teach it”
(“NPST,” 2011, p. 3 italics supplied). Each standard
is mapped to one of four stages of a career cycle:
Graduate, Proficient, Highly Accomplished and
Lead Teacher. Interestingly, out of six focus areas in
this standard, only one directly relates to common
and specialised content knowledge: “Demonstrate
knowledge and understanding of the concepts,
substance and structure of the content and teaching
strategies of the teaching area” (NPST, 2011, p. 10,
italics supplied). This focus area clearly combines
common and specific content knowledge with
knowledge of content and teaching; again we see
the area of content knowledge almost subsumed by
its pedagogical counterpart.
This point is made explicitly by an analysis
of the Self-Assessment Tool provided by the
Australian Institute for Teaching and School
Leadership (AITSL, 2013). The Tool is provided for
teachers to informally self-review their professional
progress against the National Professional
Standards for Teachers according to their stage
of career development. It is interesting to note
that while “Professional Knowledge” is the first
of three domains of teacher competency in
the NPST, of the 74 questions in the survey, no
question directly assesses the range or growth of
a teacher’s common content knowledge. It might
be concluded that common content knowledge
may be considered subordinate to other types of
professional knowledge, but a more likely scenario
is that it is assumed in the Self-Assessment Tool.
As mentioned in a previous example, this may be
because “it [seems] obvious that teachers need to
know the topics and procedures that they teach”
(Ball et al., 2008, p. 395). But again, if breadth and
depth of content knowledge is so firmly embedded
within teaching standards, should there not be
specific questions that promote “transformative
reflection” (Biggs & Tang, 2011, p. 45) in this area?
On the surface, exploring this domain of teacher
proficiency might appear to be counter-intuitive.
An academic degree, after all, confers a status of

“

No [NPST]
question
directly
assesses …
a teacher’s
common
content
knowledge.

”
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“

“teacher-readiness” on a graduate, and schools are
entitled to assume that an experienced teacher’s
content knowledge has advanced and is continually
growing. But how can such an assumption account
for the graduate teacher who still feels “out of
their depth” in terms of content at the end of their
first year? Or a proficient primary school teacher
who experiences anxiety about moving from a
new entrants’ program to teaching grade five or
six content? That such teachers have the skills to
acquire content knowledge is not at question here:
the point is simply that the scope of new knowledge
required by these teachers is, in theory, without
boundary, and in practice, often assumed. Ball et
al. (2008) note that much of the research carried
out in this area has focused on gathering data about
teachers’ conceptual frameworks and how these
translated into practice in the classroom (p. 393).
This paper engages with the discussion at a different
location; rather than providing examples of best
practice at the point of instruction, the investigation
focuses on reflexive practices at what will be
termed points of “epistemic challenge”. The aim is
to probe some areas where knowledge is presumed
or taken for granted, identify some potential triggers
of “epistemic challenge” or crisis, and suggest
some reflexive questioning examples to address
such events. Each of these elements works toward
answering the key question: What does it mean for
a teacher to “know well”?

with the current state of art in his area of expertise”
(1987, p. 19). He encountered a significant epistemic
crisis, however, when his faith was challenged by the
concept of natural selection, communicated personally
by Charles Darwin. While Gosse’s scientific instincts
were to investigate ideas, the perceived challenge
to his religious convictions in this case determined
him to have nothing to do with the new theory, and
without further investigation, he clung to his existing
view of the fixity of species (Gosse, 2004, p. 103). This
decision was one in a chain of events wherein Gosse
was ostracised by his scholarly community and the
wider reading public; he subsequently broke ties with
all elements of his life in London and moved to Devon.
Gosse carried on his scholarly work, but the damage
done to his reputation by his refusal to engage in
serious investigation of new ideas was irreparable.
Code raises some key epistemic points in her case
study of Gosse. Briefly, these are summarised in the
following way:
1) that knowledge claims and efforts to know
are events or processes in human lives; they emerge
out of interaction amongst knowledge seekers, their
communities, and the world;
2) there is no knowledge without knowers, no
knowledge without context; and
3) that knowledge cannot be stored equally in a
computer or a human mind, because people have
attitudes to knowledge that shape both its structure
and its content (p. 26).

(1987) will be outlined to illustrate the concept of
epistemic responsibility. It raises a number of important
issues and highlights some key epistemic points for
scholars and practicing educators.
Father and Son: A Study of Two Temperaments
(2004) is a memoir by Edmund Gosse. First published
in 1907, the book contains Edmund’s reflections on
his childhood, and particular emphasis is given to his
relationship with his father, Philip Henry Gosse. Gosse
senior was a fellow of the Royal Society, a man of
great intellect whose scientific peers held him in high
esteem. At the age of 22 he had a powerful conversion
experience and became a Christian. Much later Gosse
courted and married Emily Bowes, a member of his
deeply conservative faith community, the Plymouth
Brethren. Emily also displayed a keen intellect and
tirelessly wrote religious tracts until the time of her
death when Edmund was just seven years old.
A predominantly self-taught scientist, Gosse
senior is characterised by Code as a “painstaking
and indefatigable researcher…a man well in touch

Given that Code is writing from a liberal humanist
perspective it is perhaps significant that she does not
take issue with the integrity of Gosse’s religio-scientific
beliefs. She is careful to contextualise her critique
within a complex web of factors that is unique to his
situation. Gosse, she says, may be assessed as being
epistemically irresponsible for not being open to the
possibility of new knowledge for fear of eroding his
own beliefs. “It is at least arguable,” she writes, “that
one who has examined alternative positions might be
a better believer, in the long run, than one who has
shied dogmatically away from them” (p. 22). What is
at issue here is the creation/evolution debate losing a
potentially powerful contender in Gosse, because his
refusal to engage with Darwin’s ideas—or gain content
knowledge—necessarily excluded him from the
scientific discussion.
A corollary and personal consequence of Gosse’s
desire to “know well”—but only in areas that matched
his belief—is his son’s rejection of Gosse senior’s belief
system and ultimate rejection of his faith. This result is
of course unique to this situation, but the point is clear
that epistemic responsibility has consequences beyond
those that immediately affect the potential “knower”.

Epistemic
responsibility
has
consequences
beyond
those that
immediately
affect the
Code in Action: A Case Study
potential
Before applying Code’s approach to the context of a
classroom, a case study from Epistemic Responsibility
“knower”.

”

08 | TEACH | v8 n1

TEACHjournal8-1idv4.indd 8

7/08/14 1:31 PM

Teaching & Professional Practice

This is perhaps nowhere more significant than in a
classroom. Had Phillip Henry Gosse met his epistemic
crisis with some personal reflexive questioning,
perhaps a different outcome would have ensued.
Cooper (1993) uses Code’s approach to construct
some relevant epistemic questions that can be applied
to different situations. He adopts Code’s position
that reflexivity is a key to epistemic competence and
promotes the kind of Socratic questioning characteristic
of intellectual virtue. These questions include: “Do I
really know what I think I know?”; “Do I know enough
to act as I do?”; “What don’t I know?”; “What are the
moral consequences of my knowing/ignorance?”;
“Should I know more or acknowledge incomplete
knowledge?” (p. 86). Applying the question: “Do I
know enough to act as I do?” to Gosse’s situation,
an epistemically sound response would need to
acknowledge that the act of rejection requires a
thorough investigation of the subject before that
action be taken. “Should I know more or acknowledge
incomplete knowledge?” is also a relevant question.
Gosse’s refusal to investigate contrary viewpoints, his
incomplete knowledge, prompted the disrespect—and
in some cases, disdain and ridicule—of his peers. It
may be concluded from Gosse’s case that an epistemic
crisis may be precipitated by a moral dilemma, lack
of self-knowledge, failure to ask any (or the “right”)
epistemic questions, or any combination of these
circumstances.
Two further points can be made in relation to this
type of epistemic questioning. The first is the close
connection between intellectual virtue and character.
A responsibilist approach, Code writes, requires the
character qualities of honesty and humility: “honesty
not to pretend to know what one does not know (and
knows one does not) or to ignore its relevance”, and
humility not to suppress evidence challenging to one’s
preconceptions (p. 137). She suggests that humility
checks the possible excesses of “whimsicality” at
one extreme of the spectrum and “close-minded
dogmatism” at the other (p. 234). The second point is
that accurate self-knowledge is crucial in any reflexive
assessment of epistemic responsibility. This needs to be
open to revision and reflection over time (p. 58).
To summarise, the key ideas that have been
made are as follow: 1) there is a great deal of choice
involved in knowledge acquisition; 2) this calls for
epistemic responsibility on the part of the would-be
knower; 3) reflexivity is a core epistemic competence;
4) knowledge-growth should be approached with
an attitude of humility; 5) self-knowledge is vital to
effective reflexive questioning; and 6) the inherent
complexity of unique situations means that all
epistemic challenges should be assessed individually.
The remainder of this paper will discuss some

scenarios in the classroom which play out an epistemic
challenge and explore some of the ways Code’s
approach might illuminate the situation and contribute
to epistemic responsibility and professional growth.

Scenario 1
Richard is a first year teacher at a suburban secondary
school. His subject specialty is mathematics and
he is happy to be teaching a year 7 advanced
mathematics class. During one lesson, a student asks
Richard a question that may be asked in a number
of mathematics classrooms: “When would I use this
process in real life?” Richard responds that it is not
the practical application that matters, but rather the
acquisition of the skill that is important. The student
appears dissatisfied with that answer, and Richard
observes the student appears to have lost a little
enthusiasm for the class. He finishes the lesson feeling
some disappointment in himself and determines to
come prepared with a better answer the next day.
This scenario requires a particular type of common
content knowledge—it might be called “applied
common content knowledge”. Richard has always
been interested in—and proficient at—mathematical
processes for their inherent systematic integrity and
was not able to answer the fairly common question
regarding application. This epistemic challenge gives
him a reason to enquire into a domain of professional
learning for which he is not prepared. An assessment
of epistemic responsibility might ask: “Given that
Richard is qualified and demonstrably proficient
in teaching the process, is he also responsible
for providing an application for mathematical
processes?” In the unlikely situation that curriculum
specified only that students need to be proficient in
undertaking mathematical processes, an argument
could be made that Richard is not responsible for
delivering content knowledge beyond process. But
a responsibilist approach would suggest that, in fact,
this is an important part of understanding. For Code,
understanding

“
”
Do I know
enough to
act as
I do?

involves tying one’s knowledge down: relating it to
a context, having some conception of the relation
of this one “bit” of knowledge to the rest of what
one knows. … Understanding, then, involves a just
apprehension of significance and endorses an ideal
of seeing things “whole” in some sense. (p. 150)

Further, she writes that “bringing to understanding
… is as central a part of the commonability of
knowledge as is learning the opening hours of the bank
from one’s neighbor” (p. 177). Again, of course it is
unlikely that the curriculum and/or teacher proficiency
standards would not address the application of
such processes, but the point is that the demands of
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epistemic responsibility often go beyond prescribed
norms and must be met according to the situation’s
particular needs.

Scenario 2

“
”

How much
knowledge is
it responsible
to have for an
experienced
practitioner
teaching new
content?

Rose has been teaching for seven years. Since
graduating from university, she has taught new entrants
and established herself as an early childhood specialist.
However, as her school is experiencing unprecedented
growth, she has been assigned a grade six class for
the upcoming year to accommodate the need for
a third stream at this level. This poses an epistemic
challenge for Rose. She is known at the school as a
competent and enthusiastic teacher and has recently
won an award for innovation in the classroom. Rose
experiences this change of classes, however, as a crisis,
because she will be working with two well-established
teachers who are familiar with grade six curriculum.
They have a competitive, cordial professional
relationship with each other, and while they are
enthusiastic about Rose joining their team, Rose is not
sure how she will fit into this active, slightly aggressive
teaching environment.
The core concern Rose holds is that her knowledge
base regarding grade six content is deficient. She has a
wide range of professional, pedagogical competencies,
but little to no understanding about how parliament
works, is intimidated by mathematics knowledge
required at this level, and is unfamiliar with a number
of terms and processes involved in a science unit with
a biological focus. A common-sense assessment of
Rose’s epistemic responsibility in this scenario would
suggest that she simply needs to learn the content
required for teaching this class and trust her colleagues
to define the parameters of required knowledge for her.
But Rose is a high achiever with a history of excellence
in teaching and does not feel that this is enough. She
understands the concept of “horizon learning”—that is,
an awareness of how topics are related over the span
of the curriculum—and is overwhelmed at the amount
of new common content knowledge necessitated in
linking back and forward to student knowledge. She is
wondering if she should request being returned to her
previous class. Are there any questions Rose can ask
herself to assess her epistemic responsibility and set
achievable goals for the year?
Given this scenario, a key question to ask is:
“How much knowledge is it responsible to have for
an experienced practitioner teaching new content?”
Should Rose simply aim for the most basic common
content knowledge acquisition? Here Code’s reminder
“no set of rules could be produced for specifying,
incontrovertibly, what should be done in every kind
of situation” is helpful, although “it is reasonable to
assume that there are right and wrong answers to
questions about these requirements imposed upon

one’s conduct, even though the answers may not
be precisely the same for every knower” (p. 44). Of
course, the requirements of the curriculum impose
their own standards, but as outlined, Rose sees these
as imperatives and has a higher expectation of herself
than only meeting minimal requirements. Here the
constraints of the situation impose different epistemic
requirements on Rose than they would her more
experienced colleagues. Teaching in the context of
“horizon learning” is likely the stage at which her
colleagues have arrived, but Rose’s goals should be
less advanced. However, given her achievements over
the past five years, Rose might responsibly aim beyond
the minimum requirements of this stage.
A helpful approach to take for Rose is to assess her
responsibility in relation to her self-knowledge. Code
writes that
it is … sometimes easier to believe that one cannot
master a certain subject matter (i.e. to delude
oneself into believing that it is too difficult) than to
acknowledge the accessibility of the subject relative
to an accurate assessment of one’s capacities and to
tackle it. (p. 59)

Rose’s aim might be an objective assessment of
her current knowledge and capabilities: “one must
know oneself to achieve a just estimation of the
extent to which one does know, believe justifiably,
deceive oneself, or fail in epistemic responsibility” (p.
59). As mentioned earlier, self-knowledge is open to
communal challenge; Rose’s own reflections might
be helpfully modified by those around her who have
a vested interest in her professional capabilities
without the depth of subjectivity self-reflexivity
inevitably assumes. That Rose feels the tension
between her lack of common content knowledge
and the demands of the curriculum indicates that she
is exhibiting intellectually virtuous characteristics;
the challenge in this case is to harness the energy
produced by this tension to move forward into the
challenge rather than let the demands of her new
position overwhelm her.

Scenario 3
Sam is an experienced senior secondary school
history teacher. He has been teaching for 35 years
in a rural school. Sam has come to the point where,
after many years in the classroom, things are just
rolling along. He is respected by his colleagues and
well-known and liked in the wider community. In
accordance with Huberman’s (1989) five stages of
development, Sam finds himself in a phase of serenity
and self-acceptance, and perhaps even beginning to
disengage. Sam’s knowledge is wide-ranging and he
updates his curriculum documents to reflect changes
according to the current departmental requirements,
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but his content has essentially remained the same
for a number of years. Sam figures: if it works, why
change it? He encounters an epistemic challenge,
however, when he glances at his class roll a week
before classes start, and recognises a student as
the grandchild of one of his first students from his
graduate year. This gives Sam reason to pause. Is it
possible that he will be teaching much of the same
content—from a virtually unchanged knowledge
base—that he taught this student’s father? He
wonders how different is that content from the subject
knowledge he had as a graduate teacher. Sam realises
that he is using many of the same resources he has
been using for many years. What are some reflexive
questions Sam can ask to assess his epistemic
responsibility in this situation?
Sam might consider: What are the moral
implications of teaching the same content over a
number of years? What might this situation reveal
about my beliefs regarding the nature of history and
historical inquiry? What ideological messages does
this send about the nature of history to my students?
What impact might deeper and wider scope of
knowledge have on my teaching?
For Code an epistemically responsible approach
does include a degree of prudence, but to the extent
that it produces excessive conservatism, prudence
must be balanced by innovation. If a practitioner is
“more concerned with avoidance of error than with
creativity or exploration of new possibilities”, or if a
“knower” has settled into “complacency or inertia”
(p. 56), as in Sam’s case, this is potential an indicator
of epistemic irresponsibility. Code acknowledges that
there is a place for conservers of established practice
among epistemic communities, but also notes that
catalysts of cognitive change also play a vital role
in such communities. The same principle applies
to Sam’s situation: his knowledge is valuable and
should be acknowledged as such, but this epistemic
challenge carries with it the potential for cognitive
change which can enhance and revitalise his—
and consequently his students’—experience in the
classroom. Another possible outcome of epistemically
responsible practice is the impact of Sam’s action on
his—ostensibly younger—colleagues. As Code notes,
in an epistemic community
outstanding achievement tends to stimulate
emulators to go beyond it as much as it encourages
them to approach its level as nearly as possible; and
just as often, too, it provokes debate and challenge.
There is an interactive process of inspiration and
aspiration visible here, more reciprocal than
circular. (p. 188)

This is supported by research that suggests
mastery experiences of lead teachers can increase

collective efficacy beliefs of their colleagues (see for
example Goddard, Hoy, & Hoy, 2000; Protheroe,
2008).

Conclusions
A common thread running through each of these
scenarios is that epistemic responsibility demands that
a teacher be a lifelong learner. To any responsible
teacher, this is not surprising. As Shulman (1986)
reminds us, the division of “scholar” and “teacher”
is a false dichotomy; he highlights that the academic
titles “master” and “doctor” both have “teacher”
at their etymological root (p. 6). But what these
scenarios have attempted to show is that the demands
of epistemic responsibility—and, indeed, intellectual
virtue—require teachers to develop the capacity for
highly reflexive self-assessment, informed not only
by the demands of the curriculum and professional
standards, but also self-knowledge and peerassessment.
Philip Henry Gosse’s situation demonstrates that
it is, at times, easier to remain insufficiently informed.
There are circumstances where it may be reasonable
to maintain a conservative position after considering
evidence. But Gosse’s refusal to engage in thorough
investigation of evolutionary theory deprived the
critique of Darwinism of a deeply intellectual mind
and a powerfully articulate voice. The principles of
this scenario should not be lost on educators today.
The scenarios sketched in this paper demonstrate
the fact that epistemic challenges can manifest
situations as diverse as a brief classroom exchange, a
major task reassignation, or a personal challenge to
an established teacher. No matter what the context,
a conscious choice to act with intellectual virtue
is predicated on the ability to firstly recognise the
challenge, and secondly work out the parameters
of personal responsibility within a reliable reflexive
framework.
The purpose of this paper has been to articulate
the concept of epistemic responsibility and make an
initial attempt to apply it to the classroom teacher.
Clearly, its demands are different at progressive
career stages, but the injunction to “know well”
applies to all educators. Corollary questions may
follow on from this exercise: What constitutes teacher
expertise in a particular discipline? Is “expertise” a
goal to be reached? An ever-elusive bar that shifts
with each new domain of knowledge attained? A
subjective standard that depends on context and
personal experience? These issues could frame a
future discussion which continues to tease out some
of the implications embedded in the assumption
that “knowing well” is a “given” for the classroom
practitioner. TEACH

“

Outstanding
achievement
tends to
stimulate
emulators to
go beyond it.

”
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